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Abstract
‘Metonymic processing’, the ability to recognize relatedness through shared features, associations or 
part-whole relations, is a basic cognitive ability, which can be listed along with other abilities, such as 
matching, selecting, ordering and recombining. The ability to use language communicatively relies 
heavily on the ability to recognise metonymic relations at word level, but also at sentence and discourse 
level. This paper proposes a ‘general theory’ of metonymy, showing the commonality among diverse 
linguistic phenomena. It is suggested that, because metonymic processing is basic to language 
processing, an awareness of it can contribute to the training of translators, editors and language 
teachers.
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1 Engaging with Metaphor
My topic is metonymy, the recognition of part-whole relatedness between things, words 
and concepts, in other words, between signs and parts of signs. As this might initially 
seem an odd choice of topic, I will start by giving an explanation of how I came to be 
researching in this area, and why I am speaking at a psycholinguistics conference in 
Bari, rather than a conference in another field elsewhere.
I am going to do this though a personal narrative, starting with work I was doing some 
years ago as a complier on an Italian-English dictionary for the UK publisher Longman. 
At one point in this work I was working on a run in letter G and kept encountering 
words which had two senses. Many words in this run had just one sense, occasionally 
there was a highly polysemous word with many senses, but there were also a lot of 
words with two senses, one a physical concrete sense, the other a metaphorical 
extension of it, such as: grasp – you can have a physical grasp or a mental grasp of 
something; or gutted – you can gut a fish or be gutted emotionally. It seemed to me that 
there was ‘reality’, and then a system of signs representing that reality, but then a 
further metaphoric level, a sort of ‘parallel universe’, on and above that. Also, at the 
time, I was puzzled to know how it was that language succeeds in being so subtle and 
nuanced, and so fit for its communicative purpose, considering the finite resources 
available to the speaker. It seemed to me the models I had encountered until then – 
especially those concerned with syntax, heads and modifiers, and truth conditions – 
were rather crude and mechanistic, and did not really explain this flexibility sufficiently. 
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it to be both extensive and multi-disciplinary. Nowadays being multi-disciplinary is 
rather expected of one (rather like being politically correct), but the literature on 
metaphor is truly multi-disciplinary, ranging from poetics, semantics and pragmatics, to 
psycholinguistics, computational linguistics, discourse analysis, and, significantly, 
cognitive linguistics. A whole branch of scholarship has grown from Lakoff & 
Johnson’s inspiring and seminal work of 1980, Metaphors We Live By, in which 
metaphor is presented as a ‘thought’ phenomenon rather than just a ‘text’ phenomenon 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). They claim we operate, ‘live’, by reference to conceptual 
metaphors like GOOD IS UP, LIFE IS A JOURNEY, and that these ‘pattern’ conventional 
language in the mental lexicon (as well as novel utterances). What is more, Lakoff & 
Johnson see metaphor as grounded in physical reality, an embodiment of our experience 
of the physical world (not detached from it), constantly reinforced by our interactions 
with it, as laid out in their ‘Neural Theory of Language’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 
This essentially was where my reading and thinking had taken me four or so years ago, 
but then it started to occur to me that something more fundamental was going on, and 
that that something was ‘metonymy’: the recognition of part-whole relatedness between 
things, words and concepts (ie between signs or parts of signs). Metonymy seemed to 
me to be involved in a whole range of phenomena as diverse as: describing events, 
understanding indirect speech acts and structuring discourse; naming people/things, 
being persuasive, doing puzzles (like Sudoku), making jokes (especially involving word 
play and puns) and being entertained by lookalikes and impersonators. This led me to 
develop a ‘general’ theory of metonymy, that is, a theory which broadens out the 
concept of metonymy beyond the areas in which it is normally considered. Ideas from 
this general theory of metonymy are presented in the remainder of this talk. 
2 Moving into Metonymy
Metonymy is involved in the language system in a very basic way. Even in going from 
the language system as it is stored in our memories to actual utterances, we make use of 
metonymy, because our utterances are just a partial version of the full meaning of the 
words we use. This is the first part of the entry for door in the third edition of Webster’s 
International Dictionary:
DOOR … a movable piece of firm material or structure supported usu. along 
one side and swinging on pivots or hinges, sliding along a groove, rolling up and 
down, revolving as one of four leaves, or folding like an accordion by means of 
which an opening may be closed or kept open for passage into or out of a 
building, room or other covered enclosure or a car, airplane, elevator or other 
vehicle … (Hanks, 1979:32) 
This definition is elaborate, almost verging on the comical, and yet there is still much 
more to say about door, such as the material the door might be made of and the 
connotations of door. It shows how ‘big’ the sense of door is and how hard it is to pin 
down. Using a word involves excluding certain aspects (often many aspects) of the full 
meaning while retaining others. There is a narrowing from the general sense to the 
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(‘reference’) (Frege 1960 [1892]). This narrowing also occurs when we combine words. 
If we take the word red, for example, and combine it with nouns such as carpet, lorry 
and apple, in each case, red carpet, red lorry, red apple, a different quality of red is 
intended and understood. So, even when we are dealing with literal language a 
metonymic process is involved. 
Another common phenomenon involving metonymy is fixed phrases, classics like  The 
White House for ‘the US government’, or Buckingham Palace for ‘the British royal 
family’, but also everyday expressions such as to pay with plastic (credit card), the 
small screen (television), to go for a bite (go for a meal), a roof over your head  (a 
home), the hole in the wall (cash machine/ATM), to head for the door, bums on seats, a 
scratch card, a smoothie, bubbly. In all these, a part (a physical part or an attribute) is 
standing for the whole, there being more to a credit card than being made of plastic, 
more to a home than its roof, and so on. (It should be added that we do not necessarily 
need to make a connection between parts and wholes when processing these particular 
examples, as they are conventional expressions, and will usually simply be retrieved 
from the mental lexicon whole, as ready-made signs. I have given them here as 
examples in order to help make the argument easy to follow.) Another common use of 
metonymy is in naming specific objects, such as shops and publications, eg a 
hairdresser’s called Scissors, the property supplement to the Times called Bricks and 
Mortar, a magazine on wine called Decanter, the pharmacy section in a supermarket 
called Aches and Pains. 
Another way in which metonymy is commonly used in everyday interaction is in 
identifying specific individuals, especially when their names are not known or not 
salient. The individual is represented by a single characteristic, one which pertains to 
that person in a particular situation (rather than being a permanent or defining feature). 
Croft & Cruse call these ‘extrinsic metonymies’ (Croft & Cruse, 2004:217). The most 
famous metonymy in the metonymy literature is in this category: “Ham sandwich is 
waiting for his check.” This is ‘restaurant talk’, where the food a customer orders 
becomes a salient feature and the one used to identify them. This is also a phenomenon 
in ‘hotel talk’, eg “Room 47 hasn’t had her dry cleaning yet”, or ‘hospital talk’, eg “The 
appendectomy is in theatre”. A proper name is not actually very important here, or even 
useful, for the restaurant, hotel or hospital staff.
But more interesting than all this, to my mind, is the use of metonymy to give nuance. 
Metonymy is a very useful tool for expressing shades of meaning. It can be used to 
highlight a particular aspect of an event. Radden gives the example of DRIVING, 
comparing “I have been sitting behind the wheel all day” with “I was sixteen when I 
first had wheels” (Radden, 2008). Both expressions ‘mean’ DRIVING, but “sitting behind 
the wheel” emphasizes the monotony of driving, while “having wheels” emphasizes the 
freedom of driving. Radden calls these ‘event metonymies’, emphasizing the use of 
metonymy in describing an action/event, rather than just referring to an entity (Radden, 
2008).
Critical discourse analysts have long been interested in the subtle encoding of meaning, 
especially ideological meaning, through lexical choice. Though they would not use the 
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event metonymies of the sort Radden discusses. Hodge & Kress report a comparison 
undertaken by a journalist of the ‘spin’ given by the Western press to reporting of the 
First Gulf War: UK activities tended to be reported using words like reporting 
guidelines, press briefings, collateral damage,  confident,  freedomfighter …; while 
Iraqi activities were reported with words like censorship, propaganda, civilian 
casualties, desperate, terrorist … (Hodge and Kress, 1993:162). This, for me, starts to 
offer something of an explanation of the question posed at the beginning of this talk, 
suggesting where we should look to explain the flexibility of language and its subtlety.
3 Language Learning, Editing and Translation
In this section of this talk, I move on to discuss metonymy in applied language contexts: 
language learning, editing and translation. To explain the role metonymy plays in 
learner communication, I start by introducing the concept of ‘metonymic processing’, 
the use of metonymy in processing language. Let me propose a hypothetical situation to 
illustrate this concept: imagine you are on a trip to Budapest, Hungary, and on arrival 
you take a taxi from the airport to your hotel. If we imagine the conversation to be in 
English, your English and the driver’s English will probably be very different. The 
conversation would probably involve a lot of effortful processing. It would be ‘hard 
work’ on many levels: there will be differences at the level of phonology, syntax and 
semantics, at the level of pragmatics, discourse and genre; and at the level of cognitive 
frames, conceptual metaphors and social practices. There will be a difference between 
what you expect to hear and what you actually hear. It is through ‘metonymic 
processing’ that we compensate for this difference, that is, by identifying relatedness 
between the utterance you expect and the utterance you hear.
Another example: if someone were to say “What are you doing?, pronounced in this 
way, /ɔwɔt ɔɔ ɔju ɔdoɔ in/, I would experience the utterance as different from my 
variety of English in a number of ways: a different stress pattern (‘syllable timed’ rather 
than ‘stress timing’, eg /ɔwɔt ɔ juɔ ɔduɔ ɔŋ/), and differences in the positioning of the 
vowels and the placing of the consonants. But these differences would not be so great 
that I would not understand what is being said. Communication breaks down only when 
metonymic links are stretched too far, when there is not enough ‘overlap’ between the 
heard and the expected, when relatedness between the two ‘versions’ can no longer be 
identified.
Let me give a further example. This is from data I collected from an informant Zoe, in 
which she is talking about social change:
English has become more simple / they are not really full decorative embellished 
sentences / well structured sentences // they are short sentences / just swift to 
send them away / even in staccato language // and I think it has becomes more / 
because of the Americanisms / in our language / in English
In one sense, this speech event makes little sense; in another sense, it makes complete 
sense. I feel we should see learner utterances as neither ‘correct’ nor ‘incorrect’, but 
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under social pressure and which vary in their success, no different really from any 
speech event, whatever the competence of the speaker or whether learners or native 
speakers are involved. 
There are other skills involving metonymy which the people learners speak to (their 
interlocutors) need to have in their repertoires. One of those is the ability to use 
(what the creolist Ferguson was first to call) ‘foreigner talk’, that is the use of a 
modified form of a language, used by proficient speakers when speaking to learners, 
and characterized by: 
less syntactic complexity, fewer pronouns, the use of higher frequency 
vocabulary, more clearly articulated pronunciation (to the extent of 
unnaturalness, for example, by the avoidance of contractions and weak forms), 
slower speech rate, more questions (often for the purpose of checking 
understanding), as well as the tendency to speak more loudly and to repeat 
(Jenkins, 2000:177)
The relationship between foreigner talk and unaccommodated talk is metonymic, so is 
the relationship between languages, varieties of a language, registers, dialects, sociolects 
and idiolects. What editors do in the course of their work is to create versions of the 
same texts which are metonymically related to each other. Translators and interpreters 
are also constantly exploring the metonymic relations between words and strings of 
words, but between two different languages. Italian and English, for example, do not 
correspond exactly in the word categories they employ, the syntax they use their 
phraseology or their pragmatics, so a translation is never entirely ‘literal’. Neither is the 
relationship between an original (‘source text’) and a translation (‘target text’) 
metaphorical (or at least very rarely). Instead, translators and interpreters are working in 
the area of close-relatedness, where equivalences are ‘fuzzy’ rather than sharp. 
Going back to language learners, we have said that metonymy plays a role in the 
accommodation interlocutors need to make in order to understand learners and be 
understood by them; it also plays an important role when learners produce speech. What 
it allows them to do is to exploit the information they already have in the mental lexicon 
more fully. Meaning making is in its nature partial, language having a very ‘loose fit’ 
around reality. The consequence of this is that we only need to refer to a ‘part’ (or one 
aspect) in order to communicate the ‘whole’. Communication achieves far more 
flexibility than any determinist model of language, ie one in which there is a fixed one-
to-one correspondence between words and things, would suggest, as meaning can be 
‘got at’ in many different ways. These are data from my informant Zoe again:
the world has becoming more and more in speed / more speedful // and more 
superficial // because no inner characters are more admired / but more superficial 
things / the outer looking / how you look / how you react yourself / how you 
cope by not being a character
We have here a creative, expressive and fluent speech event, which cleverly exploits the 
resources the speaker has at her disposal. She uses metonymic associations to reach her 
6communicative goals. The expressions more in speed, speedful, inner characters, outer 
looking, react yourself, being a character all ‘do the job’ but do it unconventionally. 
We are left with the impression of a speaker determined to express herself in a second 
language and doing so successfully. 
What I have tried to do in this presentation is to suggest that the ability to recognise 
relatedness  between things, words and concepts, between signs and parts of signs, is a 
fundamental processing skill, which is either covertly or overtly behind all our linguist 
activities. I have also tried to show that it is a psycholinguistic approach which has 
allowed us this insight, to see commonality among a whole range of diverse linguistic 
phenomena not normally discussed together. 
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